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Employment & Employee Benefits


Dinse Brief: IRS Announces 2019 Pension and Related Limitation

The Internal Revenue Service recently announced the dollar limitations for pension plans and other items beginning January 1, 2019. Please click here for full list of limitations.

If you have any questions about this memorandum, please contact any member of our Employment & Employee Benefits practice group listed below.

Maggie Platzer

Daniel Sharpe

Brian Murphy



Two new Vermont antidiscrimination laws took effect July 1

Kendall Hoechst, Amy McLaughlin, Editors
Dinse, Knapp & McAndrew, P.C., Burlington


by Kendall Hoechst

Governor Phil Scott has signed two new laws that will have an impact on all Vermont employers. The first, a response to the #MeToo movement, is designed to protect Vermonters from sexual harassment. The second law restricts employers from making certain inquiries about applicants’ salary history, with an eye toward closing the wage gap between men and women. Both laws took effect July 1, 2018.

Preventing sexual harassment

Applicability. First, the new sexual harassment law expands the applicability of the state’s antiharassment statute to “all persons who engage a person to perform work or services” even if the individuals or entities involved might not have previously met the definition of “employer” or “employee.” That suggests the law is meant to apply broadly. The definition or meaning of “harassment” hasn’t been altered.

Antiharassment policies. Vermont employers are required to provide copies of written policies against sexual harassment to new employees upon hire. Now, you must also provide notice to all employees when you make any changes or updates to your sexual harassment policy. The statute encourages, but doesn’t require, sexual harassment education and training for newly hired employees as well as annual training for existing employees.

Employment contracts. Under the new law, you may not require any employee or prospective employee to sign an employment contract or a waiver that prevents her from opposing, disclosing, or reporting sexual harassment, or participating in a sexual harassment investigation. Likewise, you may not require employees to waive their rights or remedies with respect to a claim of sexual harassment. Any agreement that purports to do either of those things will be void and unenforceable.

Settlement agreements. The law also addresses the settlement of sexual harassment claims. Settlement agreements may not prevent an employee from working for the employer or any parent, subsidiary, division, or affiliate in the future. In other words, no-rehire clauses will render the entire settlement agreement void and unenforceable. A settlement agreement must also include certain statements affirming that the settlement does not prevent the accuser from:

  • Reporting sexual harassment to an appropriate governmental agency;
  • Complying with a discovery request (i.e., a request for evidence related to a legal claim);
  • Testifying at a hearing or trial involving a claim of sexual harassment or participating in any related investigation; or
  • Exercising his right under state or federal labor law to engage in concerted activity for mutual aid or protection.

A settlement agreement that doesn’t include those statements will be void and unenforceable. Furthermore, the settlement agreement must make it clear that the accuser isn’t waiving any rights or claims that might arise after the agreement is executed.

Enforcement powers. The new law imbues the Attorney General’s Office (AG)—or the Vermont Human Rights Commission (VHRC) if the employee works for the state—with the power to enter and inspect any place of business or employment, question any person who is authorized to receive or investigate complaints of sexual harassment, and examine an employer’s records, policies, procedures, and training materials related to sexual harassment. An employer must be given 48 hours’ notice prior to any on-site visit, but the employer can waive or shorten the notice period.

It’s important to note that an employer only has to provide redacted data on the number of complaints of sexual harassment it has received and the resolution of each complaint. You should preserve this kind of data going forward to make compliance with an inspection request from the state easier.

After an inspection, the AG must notify the employer of the results, including any issues or deficiencies; provide resources to assist with the prevention of harassment; and identify any technical assistance it may offer. If the AG deems it necessary, an employer can be required to conduct an annual education and training program, an annual anonymous workplace survey, or both, for up to three years. The AG is required to maintain the confidentiality of records and information related to or obtained through an inspection.

Notice to and participation by the state in private lawsuits. The AG remains empowered to bring enforcement actions, but individuals also have the option of filing sexual harassment complaints on their own without the state’s involvement. Any person who files such a complaint is now required to provide notice to the AG and the VHRC within 14 days of filing the complaint. Either agency has the option to intervene in the action or to file a statement with the court addressing questions of law without becoming a party.

Future efforts to reduce and address sexual harassment. Before December 15, 2018, the AG and the VHRC must develop enhanced reporting mechanisms to make it easier for employees and members of the public to submit complaints of discrimination and sexual harassment. Those mechanisms must include, at a minimum, an “easy-to- use” Web portal and a telephone hotline. The AG must submit a report on the implementation of the enhanced reporting mechanisms on or before January 15, 2020.

The law also appropriates $125,000 to the Vermont Commission on Women for the purpose of creating a public education and outreach program focused on making the public aware of methods for reporting discrimination and sexual harassment, where to find information on the laws against discrimination and harassment, and best practices for prevention.

Finally, the law directs the Office of Legislative Counsel to investigate several aspects of potential future legislation addressing nondisclosure provisions. The legislature is seeking research on requiring notice of settlement agreements that restrict the accuser from disclosing information related to a sexual harassment claim and rendering a nondisclosure agreement void and unenforceable if the alleged harasser is found to have harassed again.

Next steps. You should review your policies on sexual harassment and identify which individuals are designated to receive complaints. It would also be prudent to maintain records of any complaints you receive and all of the associated documentation. Continue to take steps to address any complaints of sexual harassment, including conducting investigations and maintaining appropriate documentation of the results as well as any remedial measures you take in response. You may want to revisit your policies and procedures to ensure they cover those issues.

You should also review your form settlement agreements to ensure they include the necessary statements and don’t contain a no-rehire clause. Finally, check your standard employment agreements to make sure they don’t limit an employee’s ability to complain about sexual harassment or participate in an agency investigation or any similar proceedings. You may want to consider adding a statement to that effect to your confidentiality provisions.

Inquiring about job applicants’ salary history

The other new antidiscrimination law prevents employers from relying on past compensation information to set the salaries of new hires. The term “compensation,” as used in the law, encompasses wages, salary, bonuses, core benefits, fringe benefits, and equity-based compensation. Employers may not:

  • Ask either a prospective employee or his former employer about his past compensation;
  • Require that a prospective employee’s previous compensation satisfy a minimum or maximum standard; or
  • Determine whether to interview a prospective employee based on his current or past compensation.

Importantly, if a prospective employee voluntarily discloses information about her previous compensation, you may seek to confirm or request that she confirm the information, but only after you make a job offer that includes a compensation amount. Furthermore, you are permitted to inquire about an applicant’s salary expectations or requirements and provide information about the wages, benefits, compensation, or salary offered for a particular position without running afoul of the statute.

Next steps. Review your application materials to ensure they don’t include any requests for salary history information. You should also take care not to raise the topic during interviews or other hiring communications.

Bottom line

Even small changes in the law can have a significant impact on employers. These changes are fairly substantial and suggest that the state will have a more critical eye on employers going forward. Not only are preventing and responding to sexual harassment and reducing the wage gap now a more robust part of Vermont law, but they are also the right thing to do.

Kendall Hoechst can be reached at or 802-859-7042.


Vermont Supreme Court again has cause to define ‘cause’ for termination

Karen McAndrew, Leigh Cole, Editors
Dinse, Knapp & McAndrew, P.C., Burlington


by Karen McAndrew

In a recent decision involving the dismissal of a police officer “for cause,” the Vermont Supreme Court again tackled the difficult question of what constitutes grounds for termination when “cause” is required but not fully defined.

A police officer is, of course, a public employee, and as such, his terms of employment are governed by state statute. One section of the law states that an officer “shall hold office during good behavior, unless sooner removed for cause,” and another provision says that an officer may be suspended or removed, after a hearing, when he is found to have “become negligent or derelict in [his] official duty, or is guilty of conduct unbecoming an officer.”

That precise language is unlikely to be found in a private-sector employer’s employee handbook or employment contracts, but many private-sector agreements expressly require cause for termination (often after a specified probationary period). In cases where employee handbooks include a step disciplinary process, courts have found that there’s an implied agreement that an employer will not terminate an employee without following the disciplinary process and having some measure of “cause.”

The facts in this particular case are interesting, and may even leave you scratching your head over how so much time and ink could have been expended over the legitimacy of the officer’s termination, but the court’s decision provides some insight into how far the courts are willing to go to ensure that employees’ rights are respected.

Police officer admits to criminal conduct

Adam Hubacz was employed by the village of Waterbury as a police officer. While he was still working for Waterbury, he applied for a similar position in another town. In connection with his application for employment, he was asked to take a polygraph, which, by statute, may be required of an applicant for a law enforcement position.

As part of the standard protocol, Hubacz was given a copy of the questions that would be asked during the polygraph. In the prepolygraph interview about the questions, he admitted that he had cheated on a police exam, engaged in insurance fraud, taken uniforms from a former employer, failed to report income on his tax returns, and impersonated a police officer to obtain retail discounts and intimidate his high-school classmates. After those admissions, the polygraph was scrapped.

The officer who conducted the interview shared the information with Hubacz’s current employer, the Waterbury police chief, who forwarded the report to the Washington County State’s Attorney. The state’s attorney concluded that Hubacz’s past conduct so undermined his credibility that the state couldn’t use him as a prosecuting witness. (It was part of Hubacz’s job to present cases to the prosecutor and testify in court.) Waterbury then placed him on administrative leave, provided him notice of its decision to terminate him, scheduled a hearing, and ultimately terminated his employment.

Sounds like the kind of history that should convince a police officer to look for another line of work, right? Well, not so fast. Six years later, the Vermont Supreme Court was still wrestling with whether Waterbury had cause to terminate Hubacz.

Case bounces back and forth in the courts

Hubacz filed claims in both state and federal court, followed by appeals, dismissals, and remands for

further hearings. He appealed to superior court after the village trustees again found cause for his termination, this time based on a determination that he had become “negligent and derelict in his official duties” because the state’s attorney’s decision meant he couldn’t bring his cases to prosecution.

The trustees also found that the conduct Hubacz revealed in the prepolygraph interview was a sufficient basis for the state’s attorney’s conclusion that he engaged in conduct unbecoming an officer that eroded public trust in law enforcement. The trustees determined that the state’s attorney’s refusal to prosecute Hubacz’s cases meant that he effectively suffered from a “legal disability” that rendered him unable to perform the essential functions of his job.

The superior court concluded that because the trustees’ ruling was based on the state’s attorney’s decision rather than any independent finding of negligence, dereliction of duty, or conduct unbecoming an officer, it could not stand. The village asked for and was granted a special appeal. The Vermont Supreme Court agreed to consider whether the section of the statute that refers to “cause” provides a stand-alone basis for termination or whether the enumeration of three specific grounds—negligence, dereliction of duty, and conduct unbecoming an officer— means that cause is limited to those three grounds.

This is where a private-sector employer’s handbook language may come in. Many handbooks list various offenses or types of misconduct that constitute cause without making clear that the list isn’t exhaustive. If the specific conduct that led to his termination isn’t on the list, a disgruntled former employee may sue the employer, claiming wrongful discharge.

Supreme court kicks it back to the trial court

The supreme court found that the “cause” referred to in one section of the statute wasn’t limited to the three grounds listed in the other section, and Hubacz’s inability to perform the duties of his office—whatever the reason— constituted good cause for termination. Thus, the trustees didn’t have to make an independent determination about whether Hubacz had in fact engaged in the conduct he admitted to at the prepolygraph interview. (We have to wonder whether the truth of Hubacz’s admitted offenses is even relevant. Is a police officer who falsely boasts of engaging in felonious conduct any more reliable and credible than one who actually engaged in such conduct?)

The court’s decision is limited by a couple of caveats, however. First, the village must determine whether Hubacz’s inability to perform his duties because of the state’s attorney’s findings could be reasonably accommodated by other means, such as assigning him other duties or ensuring that his arrests were witnessed. The court recognized that factors such as the size of the police department would weigh in the evaluation of potential accommodations.

Another concern seemed to be that the statute vests town officials with the authority to hire and fire police officers and doesn’t give the state’s attorney control over those decisions. In that regard, the court held that the state’s attorney’s decision not to prosecute an officer’s cases must be premised on valid grounds. (Again, shouldn’t the officer’s admission that he engaged in misconduct be sufficient, whether or not it’s true?) Because a prosecuting attorney is generally required to disclose any evidence that’s favorable to the defense, it’s possible that the prosecutor would have to turn over evidence that could undermine Hubacz’s credibility—and therefore harm the state’s cases.

In light of those caveats, the court sent the case back to the superior court for a determination on whether the Waterbury Police Department could accommodate Hubacz’s inability to aid in the prosecution of cases and whether the state’s attorney’s decision not to prosecute his cases was “premised on valid grounds.” So six years after he was terminated, he still doesn’t know whether he will wear a Waterbury badge again. But the rest of us may know a little bit more about what constitutes “cause” for termination.

What are the lessons for employers?

First, and probably most important, if you promise employees, through handbook language or otherwise, that they can be terminated only for cause, you would be well-advised to provide some examples of conduct that may amount to cause. But be sure you make it absolutely clear that the list is not exhaustive. You might say something like, “The following examples of conduct may constitute cause and lead to immediate termination, but this list is not exclusive and is not intended in any way to be complete or to limit the types of conduct that may lead to discipline, up to and including termination.”

The other lesson from this decision has to do with the level of scrutiny courts will give your termination decisions. As we’ve often said, if you’re going to terminate an employee for cause, you should have a wellarticulated explanation and be able to demonstrate that you’ve followed whatever prerequisite steps are laid out in your handbook or employment contract. If you haven’t followed those steps, it’s usually much less costly in the end to go back and give the employee a warning or reprimand before resorting to termination. If he then corrects the behavior, the problem will be resolved; if the behavior continues, you will have laid the appropriate groundwork for termination—which will hopefully allow you to avoid a nightmare like the six-plus years of litigation Waterbury has faced in the Hubacz case.

Karen McAndrew can be reached at or 802-864-5751.


Dinse Receives Top Rankings in Chambers USA 2018

The 2018 edition of Chambers USA, a leading directory of American lawyers and law firms, recognized 10 Dinse attorneys in their practice areas. The new guide, released May 3, 2018, also recognizes the firm as among Vermont’s best in every category of practice.

The firm’s Labor & Employment group was described as “extremely knowledgeable.” Sources say “Their expertise and experience is very helpful. They’re readily available and really good about talking through the issues.”

The firm’s Litigation group received the highest possible ranking. The team is known as a “highly impressive group with a strong reputation for defending educational institutions, construction firms and healthcare providers, among other clients.”

The firm’s Real Estate group also received the highest ranking and clients say “The team is excellent, from the lawyers to the paralegals to the administrative folks. Every ‘t’ is crossed and every ‘i’ is dotted. Everything is thorough and very timely. These people are very skilled and efficient; we never have a problem.”

The firm’s highly-ranked Intellectual Property practice is recognized as a “Noteworthy practice that specializes in technology licensing, trademarks and copyright matters. Strong experience in domestic and international trademark clearance, prosecution, registration, enforcement and maintenance.” Sources say that the firm has “the expertise and connections to handle big league matters.”

And the firm’s Corporate/Commercial group was top-ranked, with Chambers’ sources saying the firm is “practical, straightforward and easy to deal with.”

Afi Ahmadi
David Gurtman
Brian R. Murphy
Jeffrey J. McMahan
Intellectual Property

Jeffrey J. McMahan
Labor & Employment

Amy M. McLaughlin
Jeffrey J. Nolan
Karen McAndrew
Litigation: General Commercial
Ritchie Berger
Karen McAndrew
Litigation: Medical Malpractice & 
Insurance Defense
Ritchie Berger
Real Estate

Austin Hart
Molly Langan



Recent events lead us to ask: Have you developed a TAM process yet?

Jeff Nolan, Editor
Dinse, Knapp & McAndrew, P.C., Burlington


by Jeff Nolan, with contributions from Marisa Randazzo, PhD, and Gene Deisinger, PhD

Hardly a week goes by without another incident of targeted violence at a workplace, public venue, or school in the United States. Some have occurred in other parts of the country: Aurora, Colorado; Las Vegas, Nevada; Orlando, and Parkland, Florida; San Bernardino, California; and Sandy Hook, Connecticut. Some have occurred closer to home: In 2006, according to news reports, a Vermont man killed his ex-girlfriend’s mother at her home the day after the ex-girlfriend ended their abusive relationship, and then he went to the school where the ex-girlfriend worked as a teacher. He didn’t find her there, but he shot and killed a woman who was her friend and fellow teacher, and shot and wounded two other school employees before attempting suicide.

Of course, Vermonters’ attention is currently focused on the case of a young Vermont man who recently told police of his detailed plans to commit an attack on his former high school in Fair Haven. Fortunately, an acquaintance alerted police to the man’s plans, potentially averting a horrible tragedy. In response, the Vermont Legislature and Governor Phil Scott have worked together to pass unprecedented gun control and other protective legislation. In related news, the 19th anniversary of the attack at Columbine High School was observed in April, and students in Vermont and around the country continue to advocate for legislative reform.
Guns are obviously a common feature in each of these incidents or near incidents, but another common feature tends to get considerably less media coverage: Most of the shootings were preceded by a period in which the shooter carefully planned the attack and acquired weapons. Because we know that, we should be doing everything we can reasonably do to identify potential threats and intervene to prevent violence at the earliest possible stage. A process called threat assessment and management (TAM) is designed to do exactly that.

A little background

In an article published in the September 2011 issue of Vermont Employment Law Letter, I offered some suggestions to help employers perform an initial audit of their violence prevention efforts, introduced the concept of implementing TAM practices in the workplace, and set the stage for more detailed coverage of these issues in future articles (see “Smart, careful planning can reduce the threat of workplace violence” on pg. 1 of that issue).
In another article, I wrote about the October 2011 publication of an American National Standard on Workplace Violence Prevention and Intervention (WVPI Standard) by ASIS International and SHRM. That article summarized the WVPI Standard’s suggestions on developing a strong workplace violence prevention program, including a workplace TAM team (see “A New Year’s resolution worth keeping: workplace violence prevention” on pg. 1 of our December 2011 issue). This article assumes the reader’s familiarity with those previous articles.

TAM process

As we have outlined in previous articles, you should initially (1) identify the members of your TAM team, (2) give it a name that works for your organization, (3) plan how you will let employees know the team exists, and (4) determine how you will train employees to report behavior or comments that suggest someone poses a risk to himself or others to a member of the team ASAP, without fear of retaliation. In conjunction with those steps, you will need to plan, in general terms, how the TAM team will respond to reports it receives.
Again, research has shown that perpetrators of serious targeted violence don’t just “snap.” Certainly, impulsive affective violence sometimes does occur in heated situations, but research and analysis have shown that targeted attacks more commonly involve advance planning by the perpetrator. Most attackers consider, plan, and prepare before engaging in violent behavior. That was true of the attacks in Aurora, Las Vegas, Orlando, Parkland, San Bernardino, and Sandy Hook. Similarly, a police affidavit supporting charges filed in connection with the Fair Haven case contains chilling details about the suspect’s meticulous planning of how he would finance his purchase of weapons and ammunition, murder the school resource police officer, carry out the attack, and then commit suicide. Suicide is also a common thread in targeted attacks: Research has shown that most perpetrators are suicidal, or at a point of desperation, before the attacks.

The research has implications for employers’ prevention efforts: Because information about a person’s ideas and plans to cause harm can be observed or discovered in advance, incidents of workplace violence can be prevented in some cases. The problem is, the available information is likely to be scattered, and “leakage” of clues may occur by various means. For example, employees of concern may talk with coworkers about their grievances, suggest that violence is a reasonable response to their circumstances, and even inform others of their acquisition of weapons and other planning steps. Therefore, your TAM team needs to act quickly after receiving an initial report from a concerned employee, determine if someone else has a piece of the puzzle, and then assemble the information to see what picture emerges. The TAM process helps structure the way in which the team does that work.

This article focuses generally on steps recommended by two sources: Dr. Marisa Randazzo and Dr. Gene Deisinger, and the ASIS/SHRM WVPI Standard. Randazzo and Deisinger outline their steps in their “Handbook for Campus Threat Assessment & Management Teams” (referred to throughout this article as the “TAM Handbook” and available at Significantly, the TAM Handbook was recommended as a resource in “A Risk Analysis Standard for Natural and Man-Made Hazards to Higher Education Institutions,” published by the ASME Innovative Technologies Institute, LLC, and approved by the American National Standards Institute in 2010. While the TAM Handbook was written primarily for a higher education audience, its concepts are easily transferable to noneducational workplaces, particularly because it was intended to be used to assess potential threats posed by employees as well as students.

First things first: Is the situation an emergency?

The TAM Handbook and the WVPI Standard are consistent in recommending that a TAM team’s or management employee’s first duty after receiving information about suspicious behavior is to decide quickly whether there’s an imminent threat or emergency. Because of the urgency involved, that determination will have to be made based on readily available information, such as the initial report and any background information members of the team or other sources close to the situation have. If the situation is deemed an emergency, then law enforcement needs to be contacted and crisis management/physical safety measures must be implemented immediately.

The TAM team will eventually need to conduct a full threat assessment inquiry and take appropriate measures if the potential perpetrator is released from custody, but in an emergency or imminent threat situation, the team’s primary course of action is to notify law enforcement to ensure the situation is contained. Once the immediate risk is contained, the team can proceed with the more advanced threat assessment steps outlined below, tailored to the circumstances.

In anticipation of the potential need to involve law enforcement, you should develop or enhance your relationship with local law enforcement agencies. Let those agencies know that you are adopting a TAM process, and work with them to identify ways in which you can best interact in emergent and nonemergent (but concerning) situations. It’s important to do this as soon as possible, and not wait until a troubling situation has already arisen, because advance planning and relationship building can create trust and save valuable time when it may count most.

Second step: Perform initial data gathering and risk screening

If the TAM team determines there’s no emergency or imminent threat, it should move on to initial data gathering and risk screening. Those tasks should also be performed when the person of concern has been removed from the workplace by law enforcement through a criminal law or involuntary hospitalization process if it appears that he will be released from custody in the near future. The WVPI Standard distinguishes this step by the TAM team from “a more elaborate process performed by specifically qualified [threat assessment] personnel.” The purpose of the data gathering and risk screening is to “assist the [TAM team] in determining the general urgency of a situation and appropriate initial actions to take.”

The TAM team should seek out information from all available resources and people who may be familiar with the person of concern. This information-seeking process is crucial and distinguishes the TAM team’s work from less active HR-related workplace functions. According to the WVPI Standard, sources of initial information can include:

  • Employees who reported the concerning behavior or are potential targets of the behavior;
  • Current and former supervisors of an employee who is the person of concern, the HR professional most closely associated with the employee, the employee’s personnel file, and his workplace computer, e-mail account, and other electronic communications and Internet usage history (Hopefully, you have a clear policy informing employees that they have no expectation of privacy in their workplace computer activity.); • All communications by the employee that have generated concern;
  • All communications received from a third party who is the person of concern as well as a criminal background check, if possible (which can be performed on anyone in Vermont through the Vermont Criminal Information Center); and
  • Publicly available information about the person of concern, such as information found on Google, Facebook, and YouTube.

The TAM team’s review and analysis of social media activity has become even more crucial and potentially fruitful since the WVPI Standard was published in 2011 because the use of social media has obviously increased rapidly in the intervening period. The TAM team should work with your IT professionals ahead of time to understand how to best navigate likely sites of interest, so they can move quickly and efficiently if a threat assessment becomes necessary.

The WVPI Standard cautions that “a formal violence risk assessment shall be conducted solely by specifically qualified and credentialed personnel or outside consultants.” However, when doing the initial data gathering, a TAM team could perform its preliminary triage work and gain some insight into whether an increased risk of violence may be present by focusing on certain key questions, including:

  • What appears to be motivating the person to make the concerning statements or take the concerning actions?
  • What has the person communicated about her intentions? • What interest, if any, has the person shown in violence or its justification, violent perpetrators, weapons, or extremist groups?
  • Has the person engaged in planning and preparation for violence, such as approaching a target or site, breaching security, or monitoring, harassing, or stalking a target?
  • Does the person have a known or suspected history of a mental illness or substance abuse? Has the person exhibited symptoms of paranoia, delusions, hallucinations, extreme agitation, despondency, or suicidal tendencies (especially with any violent content)? Has he ever acted on those beliefs?
  • Is there any evidence of serious oppositional or counterproductive attitudes or behavior in the workplace (e.g., unjustified blaming of others, a strong sense of entitlement, defensiveness, or intolerance of others’ rights)?
  • How does the person manifest her anger, and how focused is that anger on individuals in the workplace?
  • Has the person experienced (or is he likely to soon experience) any serious personal or financial stressors (e.g., loss of his job or status, divorce, a custody dispute, or a death in the family)? Does he show poor coping skills in reaction to those stressors?
  • What is the person’s known history of serious interpersonal conflict, violence, or other criminal conduct in domestic or other settings?
  • Is there evidence of any organizational, supervisory, or workplace problems that have contributed to or provoked the behavior/statements of concern, and how do those problems influence the individual’s perception of her circumstances?

The WVPI Standard also includes key questions aimed at disclosing factors that may lower or mitigate the risk of violence, such as:

  • Does the person of concern have valued family or other positive personal attachments?
  • Has the person expressed genuine remorse for making threats or engaging in the concerning behavior?
  • Has the person responded positively to defusing or limit-setting efforts by others?
  • Has the person engaged in appropriate problem solving or sought professional treatment or legal recourse as a way to manage a stressful situation?
  • What services have been offered to the individual and accessed positively?

The WVPI Standard recognizes that answers to many of these questions may not be available initially or at all, so they should serve as suggested areas of inquiry when practical rather than a “punch list” that must be completed exhaustively in every case. The standard also cautions that the TAM team should consult with legal counsel during the information-gathering process to ensure compliance with applicable laws (and, I will add, employer policies).

Third step: Evaluate information from the initial risk screening

The WVPI Standard states that after the TAM team gathers the initial information, it should evaluate the information from a lay perspective. Questions asked at this point should include:

  1. Is the concern about potential violence unwarranted, meaning the individual’s behavior can be handled within normal HR, disciplinary, or employee relations protocols rather than through a TAM process?
  2. Is some concern about violence warranted, but not significant or urgent, so that the TAM team can continue with additional fact gathering and its incident management processes?
  3. Is the concern about violence high enough that consulting law enforcement personnel or a violence risk assessment professional warranted?

If the team concludes that the situation falls within categories (2) or (3), it should retain a connection to the case and initiate case/threat management efforts.

Fourth step: Begin formal threat assessment/threat management process

Very high-functioning TAM teams with access to in-house expertise in professional threat assessment may view the assessment and management activities as separate, but few Vermont employers will have that capacity. For the majority of employers, it’s fair to say that if an in-house TAM team determines that a situation falls somewhere between categories (2) and (3), the employer should engage a qualified threat assessment professional and legal counsel to guide its threat management efforts.

The WVPI Standard suggests that “immediate or early consultation with a qualified violence risk assessment professional is particularly advised when the [TAM team] feels uncertain in its ability to accurately evaluate risk even in a general or gross fashion.” The threat assessment professional will determine whether a formal threat assessment process is warranted, and the TAM team will work with the professional and legal counsel to gather information as necessary and appropriate.

In terms of threat management, the WVPI Standard suggests that in addition to retaining a threat assessment professional and legal counsel, the TAM team can:

  • Continue or expand its information collection efforts.
  • Assess the need for additional physical security.
  • Initiate coordination with local law enforcement.
  • Work with HR to implement employment actions such as discipline, suspension, termination, referral to an employee assistance program (EAP), or administrative leave (while recognizing that termination alone doesn’t guarantee safety and may actually increase the risk of violence).
  • When the person of concern is an employee who appears to be suffering from a mental illness, consult with legal counsel to determine the organization’s obligations and rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)—an issue that will be discussed in a later article.
  • When the person of concern is a third party, consider professional surveillance efforts, within legal parameters.
  • Work with counsel to initiate appropriate legal action (such as a restraining order, protective order, or no-trespass notice) if, after careful evaluation and consultation with a threat assessment professional, it is determined that such action will actually enhance, rather than diminish, the overall threat management efforts. If not well conceived, legal action can precipitate rather than minimize threatening behavior.

The TAM Handbook similarly states that in the threat management phase, the TAM team should develop, implement, monitor, and document a plan to intervene and reduce the threat. The plan should be customized to address the person of concern and the situation with the best resources available or accessible to the team and the organization. The goal of a threat management plan is to help shift the person of concern away from thoughts and plans for violence/suicide and get him help with addressing his problems.

Randazzo and Deisinger note that threat management plans can include any of the following options, as well as others dictated by the situation and resources:

  • Monitor the situation for further developments.
  • Engage with the person of concern to deescalate the situation.
  • Involve an ally or trusted friend to monitor the person of concern.
  • Notify the person’s family.
  • Seek help from law enforcement.
  • Undertake disciplinary review and action.
  • Implement a behavioral contract.
  • Suggest voluntary referral for mental health evaluation and/or treatment.
  • Mandate a psychological assessment.
  • Require involuntary hospitalization for evaluation and/or treatment. (This is difficult to obtain in Vermont, but legal counsel and/or law enforcement can be consulted on the issue.)
  • Initiate leave or separation from employment (voluntary or involuntary).
  • Modify the environment to mitigate the impact of contributory factors.
  • Collaborate with the identified target/victim to decrease her vulnerability.
  • Monitor and prepare for the impact of likely precipitating events.

The TAM Handbook emphasizes that once the TAM team has created a threat management plan, it’s just as important to document the plan, implement it, and monitor how well it is working—to make sure it’s having the intended effect and not inadvertently making the situation worse. Consulting a threat assessment professional and legal counsel during the threat management phase is therefore advised.

It’s important to note that a person can continue to pose a threat even after he is no longer connected with the organization. For instance, the suspect in the Fair Haven case left Fair Haven High School for another school but still continued to pose a threat. The TAM Handbook states that the TAM team should continue to monitor the plan and modify it as needed for as long as the person/situation reasonably poses a threat. It may be necessary for the TAM team to continue to refer the person of concern to necessary resources or take other follow- up steps as the situation and level of concern dictate.

As it considers the factors that may affect the person’s behavior in the short, mid, and long term, the TAM team should anticipate the impact of future precipitating events that could prompt the person to become an increased threat—i.e., important personal dates or anniversaries, termination of benefits, formal termination of employment, or the occurrence or anniversary of well publicized targeted attacks elsewhere. The team should develop contingency plans and take steps to reduce or mitigate the anticipated threats.

Fifth step: Close and document the case

The TAM Handbook emphasizes that cases handled by a TAM team generally remain open until the person of concern no longer appears to pose a threat. That may be well beyond when mental health services are completed or a criminal case is closed (or even dismissed, as your internal process shouldn’t depend on the outcome of the criminal justice system). Whether the case remains open or is closed, the TAM team should document how it handled the case, including the report that first came to the team’s attention, the information the team gathered, its evaluation of the information, the case management plan it developed and implemented (if necessary), and any reevaluations or monitoring after its initial evaluation and case management efforts. Such documentation is very sensitive given the potential risks involved, so the TAM team should work with legal counsel.

Bottom line

I hope this outline of the TAM process provides a useful perspective on how a TAM team can function internally and how it can determine when to seek the assistance of outside resources. Of course, training on TAM issues is available, so you can determine for yourself how highly you want your team to function and obtain TAM training at a level that works in your particular circumstances.

The bottom line is, the general TAM process should be in place at every workplace so the team can be mobilized quickly when necessary. The team should at least have enough training and previous work experience to understand the roles and basic functions team members will perform in the event of an emergency. Obviously, that advance work should be done long before a critical incident occurs.

Unfortunately, recent events nationally and locally emphasize how important it is for all employers, even employers in our relatively peaceful state, to do what you reasonably can to prevent workplace violence. TAM teams should be seen as a crucial component of an overall workplace violence prevention system and created, trained, and supported accordingly.

This article updates a 2015 article to provide information about recent events and a detailed outline of how the TAM process should operate in most workplace settings. In addition to citing the WVPI Standard’s discussion of the TAM process, I’ve relied on the work of Marisa Randazzo, PhD, and Gene Deisinger, PhD, with whom I work regularly through Sigma Threat Management Associates ( Randazzo and Deisinger are threat assessment professionals who practice nationally. Their contributions are gratefully acknowledged.

Jeff Nolan can be reached at or 802-864-5751.


‘Woke dicta’? Title VII covers sexual orientation discrimination

Kendall Hoechst, Amy McLaughlin, Editors
Dinse, Knapp & McAndrew, P.C., Burlington


by Kendall Hoechst

Vermont employers should know that the Vermont Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA) explicitly prohibits discrimination based on not only employees’ sex but also their gender identity and sexual orientation (as well as other protected categories). Thus, on its face, Vermont law is broader than its federal equivalent, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex but doesn’t include the separate characteristics of sexual orientation or gender identity.

Previously, the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals (whose rulings apply to all Vermont employers) held that sexual orientation discrimination claims, including claims that being gay or lesbian constituted nonconformity with a gender stereotype, weren’t covered under Title VII. The 2nd Circuit revisited its previous decisions in a rare en banc sitting—meaning with all the members of the court rather than a three-judge panel—in Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc. The majority held that Title VII prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation as discrimination “because of . . . sex.”


Donald Zarda, a gay man, was employed as a skydiving instructor at Altitude Express. He frequently participated in tandem dives with Altitude Express clients, which involved being strapped hip to hip and shoulder to shoulder before jumping out of the airplane. Zarda told a female client that he was gay to preempt discomfort with being strapped closely to a man. However, the client claimed that he touched her inappropriately and disclosed his sexual orientation to excuse his behavior. He denied inappropriately touching her. After the jump, the client told her boyfriend her allegation of inappropriate touching. The boyfriend told Zarda’s boss, who fired him.

Zarda sued his employer under both New York law and Title VII, claiming that he was fired because he referred to his sexual orientation and because he didn’t conform to the “straight male macho stereotype.”

The trial court held that Zarda’s Title VII claims were barred under the 2nd Circuit’s previous precedent and ruled in favor of the employer on the federal claim. After a trial on the state-law claim, which required a different standard of proof than the federal claim, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the employer. Zarda appealed to the 2nd Circuit.
Interestingly, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) took opposing views in amicus briefs submitted to the court—i.e., arguments intended to influence the court’s decision written by parties that are not directly involved in the case but have an interest in the outcome. The DOJ argued that Title VII doesn’t prohibit sexual orientation discrimination. The EEOC claimed to be the “primary agency” charged with interpreting Title VII and argued the opposite.

The majority opinion had three primary holdings. First, the court held that sexual orientation is a function of sex and, by extension, sexual orientation discrimination is a subset of sex discrimination. The majority concluded that firing a man because he is attracted to men or a woman because she is attracted to women is a decision motived, at least in part, by sex.
Second, the court held that sexual orientation discrimination is rooted in gender stereotypes and thus is a subset of sex discrimination. It recognized that its previous precedents were unworkable because of the difficult lines that were required to be drawn. For example, a woman might have had a Title VII claim if she was fired for being perceived as too “macho” but not if she was fired for being perceived as lesbian.

Third, the court held that sexual orientation discrimination is based on an employer’s opposition to association between particular sexes and thereby discriminates against employees based on their sex. The 2nd Circuit had previously recognized associational discrimination as a violation of Title VII in the context of race discrimination. Thus, like antimiscegenation policies, discrimination based on sexual orientation is a form of associational discrimination prohibited by Title VII.

Four concurring opinions and three dissenting opinions were authored by various judges. Judge Dennis Jacobs concurred in only the associational discrimination justification and found it unnecessary to reach the others, explaining, “A ruling based on Mr. Zarda’s same-sex relationship resolves this appeal; good craft counsels that we go no further. Much of the rest of the Court’s opinion amounts to woke dicta [socially conscious observations that aren’t binding as legal precedent].”

Judge Robert Sack’s opinion also concluded that the appeal could be decided on the “simpler and less fraught” theory of associational discrimination. He noted that the court is in “the context of something of a revolution in American law respecting gender and sex” and therefore thought it best to tread carefully.

Judge José Cabranes concurred only in the judgment in a very brief opinion, essentially opining that his colleagues spilled too much ink getting to the point that sexual orientation is a function of sex, end of story. Judge Cabranes even dropped a footnote quoting a text from the third century B.C. to underscore his point that less is more. Judge Raymond Lohier, Jr., favored a textualist approach and concluded that sex subsumes sexual orientation just as race subsumes ethnicity.

The primary dissent was authored by Judge Gerard Lynch. He explained that he would be “delighted to wake up one morning and learn that Congress had just passed legislation adding sexual orientation to the list of grounds of employment discrimination prohibited under Title VII” and would be “equally pleased to awake to learn that Congress had secretly passed such legislation more than half a century ago.” However, “we all know Congress did no such thing.” He examined the historical context of the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and essentially concluded that classifying people by sexual orientation isn’t the same as classifying them by sex. Discrimination against people whose sexual orientation is homosexual rather than heterosexual, however offensive, isn’t discrimination that treats men and women differently. He also distinguished the majority’s arguments from the U.S. Supreme Court’s constitutional analysis of gay marriage.


The 2nd Circuit is the third federal appellate court to consider sexual orientation discrimination questions recently. The 7th Circuit, also sitting en banc, ruled in Hively v. Ivy Tech that discrimination based on an employee’s sexual orientation violates Title VII. The 11th Circuit, however, held the opposite in Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital and declined to hear the case en banc. The 8th Circuit is the next court to consider the issue.

Recently, Vermont Attorney General T.J. Donovan joined other attorneys general in filing an amicus brief arguing that Title VII encompasses discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.

There’s now a split among federal circuit courts. The split could be resolved by the Supreme Court or Congress, but the latter seems unlikely in the current political climate. For now, the 2nd Circuit’s decision is the law in Vermont, New York, and Connecticut.

While it was—and remains—illegal to discriminate on the basis of an employee’s sexual orientation in Vermont, the 2nd Circuit’s decision will permit employees to pursue federal discrimination claims based on sexual orientation. That makes it more likely that employees will file future claims in federal court.

Furthermore, Vermont courts still look to federal law when interpreting state law, so future federal decisions regarding discrimination based on sexual orientation will have implications for state law.

Kendall Hoechst can be reached at or 802-859-7042.


Vermont newspaper editor learns that free speech comes with a price

Karen McAndrew, Leigh Cole, Editors
Dinse, Knapp & McAndrew, P.C., Burlington

by Karen McAndrew

When a person who is paid to edit the written words of others fails to edit his own words, his job may be in jeopardy.


Early this year, Denis Finley, editor of the Burlington Free Press, Vermont’s largest newspaper, was fired for the tone and content of several tweets about matters in the news. Like most print media, the Free Press has watched its subscribership and advertising revenue decline as fewer and fewer people wait for the arrival of a morning newspaper on their doorstep. As a result, “tweeting” and connecting on social media were apparently encouraged as part of Finley’s role in a nod to the direction in which the news business is headed—faster, shorter, instantaneous feeds of information to a public that has access to cable and network news 24/7.

Gannett, which owns the Free Press, has a policy that makes clear that social media is “core to [its] strategic goal of reinventing local journalism in the digital age.” As editor of the paper, it was not out of line for Finley to post editorial comments on matters of interest in the news. And post he did, often in the rapid-fire “Twittersphere.”

In covering Finley’s firing, the Washington Post’s “Morning Mix,” a blog about news from around the world, quoted several tweets that did not lead to his firing but did provoke strong opposition. When the New York Times tweeted that President Barack Obama (by then out of office) would be the first guest on David Letterman’s new Netflix talk show, Finley shot back, “Another reason not to subscribe to Netflix.” When Politico tweeted, “2017 is almost over. Here are the 18 politicians, activists, and operatives to watch in the new year,” Finley responded, “In other words, ignore them. Politicians, activists and operatives are what got us into this mess. The only people who care are whores, like Politico.” VTDigger, an online investigative reporting source, noted that Finley had made light of allegations of sexual misconduct against Roy Moore and Charlie Rose in other tweets.

Finley’s firing was a result of a Twitter war he started in response to a news report that Vermont was considering putting a third gender option on driver’s licenses. He commented: “Awesome! That makes us one step closer to the apocalypse.” Critics and critics of the critics on both sides jumped in, and Finley didn’t let it drop. He responded to one offended follower by asking, “What if someone said it’s awesome they are going to recognize pedophiliacs on licenses?” He wrote, “I’m not being snarky, I’m just asking. Not all recognition is awesome.”

Gannett promptly announced that Finley had “left the company.” Finley reportedly said he was fired because he expressed opinions with which the company disagreed. The company said he was fired because he violated its social media policy. Gannett’s social media policy is posted online and admonishes all employees not to “post comments that include discriminatory remarks, harassment, threats of violence or similar content” and to “exercise discretion in sharing personal information, and political, cultural or religious views.” Although Gannett has not publicly pointed to those provisions in discussing Finley’s termination, it seems likely that the prohibition against making “discriminatory remarks” about a topic of political interest was the language used to justify his firing.

But what about the First Amendment?

Many online comments about Finley’s firing asked what happened to the right to free speech and the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The Constitution, however, has little to do with it, and references to the First Amendment reflect a lack of understanding of its reach. The Bill of Rights, which the First Amendment helps form, states in relevant part, “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”

Although public employers and employers that receive certain federal funds face limitations on the extent to which they can restrict speech, the limitations on Finley’s speech (and the consequences of him expressing his opinions) were imposed by Gannett (a private employer), not by a governmental or government- funded agency. And even public employers may impose reasonable restrictions on the “time, place, and manner” of speech.

What should employers do with this knowledge?

There are limitations in the law on even private employers silencing speech. You cannot, for example, prohibit employees from discussing the terms or conditions of their employment, and in Vermont, you cannot prohibit employees from discussing their wages with each other. However, it is perfectly acceptable to enact policies governing speech that is disrespectful or vulgar, discloses confidential company information, or contravenes the values your company ascribes to. You may take disciplinary action against employees who violate your company’s stated policies or guidelines.

In this age of the rapid proliferation of social media— where much of the dialogue seems derogatory, defamatory, and grossly inappropriate in a civilized society— enacting a social media policy that sets guidelines for employees who may have become inured to the harm that can result from social media makes good sense. If you have questions or concerns about what limitations may be imposed on employee speech, consulting with counsel could prevent headaches down the road.

Karen McAndrew can be reached at or 802-864-5751.


New Vermont pot law: what employers need to know

Amy M. McLaughlin, Kendall Hoechst, Editors
Dinse, Knapp & McAndrew, P.C., Burlington

by Jeff Nolan

Soon, it will be legal in Vermont for people who are 21 or older to possess limited quantities of marijuana and marijuana plants. You may be wondering whether the new law affects your ability to enforce rules on smoking or the use of drugs in your workplace. In short, the answer is, nope. In crafting the law, the Vermont Legislature specifically addressed workplace issues and made clear that the law doesn’t require employers to change their policies or permit the use or possession of marijuana at work.

General provisions of the law

The new law, titled “An act relating to eliminating penalties for possession of limited amounts of marijuana by adults 21 years of age and older,” was signed by Governor Phil Scott on January 22, 2018. The portions of the law relevant to our discussion will go into effect on July 1. The law defines “marijuana” as “all parts of the plant,” including seeds, resin, and compounds derived from the plant, its seeds, or its resin, but not mature stalks, hemp, or other excluded parts.

As of July 1, 2018, individuals who are 21 years old or older will be permitted to possess up to one ounce of marijuana or five grams of hashish, and cultivate up to two mature marijuana plants or four immature marijuana plants. Criminal penalties apply if a person possesses more than is allowed by those limits. The criminal penalties increase with second and third offenses, and with larger amounts of marijuana.

The law prohibits the consumption of marijuana in a “public place,” which is defined as “any street, alley, park, sidewalk, public building other than individual dwellings, any place of public accommodation [as defined in the Vermont Public Accommodations Act, or VPAA], and any place where the use or possession of a lighted tobacco product, tobacco product, or tobacco substitute . . . is prohibited by law.”

The law doesn’t protect people who possess or consume marijuana from laws related to driving under the influence of marijuana or consuming marijuana while driving, it doesn’t limit the authority of primary or secondary schools to impose administrative penalties for the possession of marijuana on school property, and it doesn’t prohibit landlords from, among other things, banning the possession or use of marijuana in lease agreements.

Provisions of particular interest to employers

Some provisions of the law actively prohibit marijuana use in workplaces, while others explicitly allow employers to continue to regulate whether marijuana can be possessed or used on their premises.

In terms of active prohibitions, as noted above, the law prohibits the “consumption” of marijuana in a “public place,” which includes “any place of public accommodation as defined in” the VPAA. The definition of “public accommodation” in the VPAA is broad and includes “any school, restaurant, store, establishment, or other facility at which services, facilities, goods, privileges, advantages, benefits, or accommodations are offered to the general public.” That means people will still be prohibited from consuming marijuana in a workplace that falls within that definition, regardless of the employer’s policies.

Similarly, the law actively prohibits the consumption of marijuana in “any place where the use or possession of a lighted tobacco product, tobacco product, or tobacco substitute” is prohibited by law. As Vermont employers know, Vermont law generally prohibits, with some exceptions, smoking in “an enclosed structure where employees perform services for an employer.” That means people are not permitted to consume marijuana in the vast majority of workplace settings that are not specifically exempted from the law prohibiting smoking in the workplace.

The new pot law also reserves for employers the ability to continue to regulate the possession or use of marijuana on the job. Specifically, the law provides that none of its provisions should be construed to:

  • Require an employer to permit or accommodate the use, consumption, possession, transfer, display, transportation, sale, or growing of marijuana in the workplace;
  • Prevent an employer from adopting a policy that prohibits the use of marijuana in the workplace;
  • Create a claim against an employer that terminates an employee for violating a policy that restricts or prohibits employees’ use of marijuana; or
  • Prevent an employer from prohibiting or otherwise regulating the use, consumption, possession, transfer, display, transportation, sale, or growing of marijuana on the employer’s premises.

Those provisions mean you are essentially free to maintain or create policies that prohibit the possession, consumption, sale, or cultivation of marijuana and terminate employees who violate your policies, and the law doesn’t create a method by which employees can sue you for doing that (known as a “private right of action”).

It should be noted that the marijuana law doesn’t mention Vermont’s drug-testing law. As Vermont employers know, the drug-testing law places strict limitations on when and how employees can be subjected to drug testing. Those restrictions must continue to be observed carefully, and you shouldn’t view the legalization of marijuana as permission to conduct more stringent drug testing that isn’t allowed by the drug-testing law. On the other hand, if you permissibly test an employee and the result is positive for marijuana use in violation of your policies, the marijuana law wouldn’t prevent you from taking action under your policies to the extent permitted by the drug-testing law.

Medical marijuana

The medical marijuana/disability issue is also worth noting. Employment disputes involving medical marijuana usually revolve around questions of whether the use of marijuana is “lawful.” The use of medical or recreational marijuana remains unlawful under federal law, regardless of Vermont’s new marijuana law. So if an employee appears to be under the influence of marijuana at work, you can take action even if the employee is authorized to use medical marijuana.

However, if an employee tests positive for marijuana use through a drug test, there’s no question about whether he’s impaired at work, and he explains that he uses marijuana for medical reasons, it would be worthwhile to consult legal counsel about the best way to arrive at a practical solution that could resolve the issue while respecting any safety-related requirements of the employee’s job and your worksite. (For more on Vermont’s medical marijuana law, see “Employers’ medical marijuana rights, obligations under Vermont law” on pg. 1 of our February 2016 issue.)

Policy implications

Many employers have enacted policies that prohibit the possession, consumption, or distribution of “illegal drugs” but do not mention marijuana specifically or list all of the drugs that are prohibited. As we noted above, marijuana remains an illegal drug under federal law. The new Vermont marijuana law eliminates only state-law penalties for the possession and use of marijuana within certain parameters. Therefore, a policy that references “illegal drugs” would still technically be effective. However, if you want to clarify the point and avoid after-the-fact policy interpretation arguments with your employees, you may wish to specifically identify marijuana as a prohibited substance in your policies.

Bottom line

It’s good to see that lawmakers were thinking of Vermont employers when they crafted the new marijuana law and eliminated some potential questions before they could even be asked. In sum, if your organization prohibits the possession, use, and distribution of marijuana on the job, it will be business as usual. That shouldn’t be surprising since employers can obviously prohibit the use of legal substances such as alcohol in the workplace, and the liberalization of marijuana laws shouldn’t affect employer discretion on safety-related issues.

If you don’t have explicit policies addressing marijuana use but anticipate that you may be asked about your stance in light of the new law, you should consider creating some policy language clarifying your organization’s position on marijuana use, particularly in workplace areas covered by the law prohibiting smoking in the workplace and in places of public accommodation. Then, if an employee asks to use pot at work and tells you that you can’t prohibit it under the new law, you can say with confidence: “Dude, you must be high! Read the policy!”

Jeff Nolan can be reached at or 802-864-5751.


2nd Circuit lambastes employer: ‘You should have known!’

Amy M. McLaughlin, Kendall Hoechst, Editors
Dinse, Knapp & McAndrew, P.C., Burlington

by Amy McLaughlin

The “#MeToo” movement is sweeping across the country and calling well-deserved attention to the issue of sexual harassment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit (whose rulings apply to all Vermont employers) is following suit. In a recent decision, the 2nd Circuit chided an employer for not doing enough to monitor the work environment and ensure it was harassment-free. Employers, pay attention: This case illustrates the new standard of heightened awareness.


In late 1999 or early 2000, a female dental assistant complained to the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities that Dr. Michael Young, the dentist with whom she worked at University of Connecticut Health Center (UConn Health), had harassed her. The dental assistant alleged that Young sent her gifts and notes saying things like “You’re beautiful” or “I love your smile.”

The complaint resulted in a “last-chance” agreement between Young and UConn Health that required Young to see a psychiatrist and imposed a 10-day suspension on him for “offensive conduct towards a [coworker], poor judgment, and not cooperating during the initial investigation.” The agreement further provided that he could be fired for “any future instances of unsolicited flirtatious letters or comments to any employee, or any behavior similar to this.”

When he returned to work following his suspension, Young received no additional attention, monitoring, or training. Further, UConn Health never informed his subsequent supervisors that he had been the subject of a sexual harassment complaint or that he was disciplined as a result of the complaint, including being put on a last-chance agreement.

Fast-forward to March 2008, when UConn Health hired Mindy MacCluskey as a dental assistant. MacCluskey began working with Young two days a week at Manson Youth Institute, a Connecticut Department of Corrections facility. Approximately six months after she began working at Manson, Young started making comments about MacCluskey’s appearance and what she was wearing, called her “young and beautiful,” and commented that he was surprised she had three children. He also asked her personal questions that made her uncomfortable, such as inquiring about her relationship with her children’s father and asking whether “anybody has ever cheated.” Moreover, he stood very close to her in a way she described as “creepy.”

MacCluskey reported Young’s conduct to both a coworker and a nurse who was also a union representative. Someone then reported to Dr. Alexis Gendell, who supervised both Young and MacCluskey at Manson, that there was a concern at the dental clinic. Gendell stopped MacCluskey in the hallway and asked “if there was a situation, is everything [OK],” to which MacCluskey replied, “There is a situation and I’m all set. It is under control.”

UConn Health never made Gendell aware of the earlier sexual harassment complaint against Young or his last-chance agreement. Gendell didn’t follow up on the conversation with MacCluskey to inquire about the nature of the concern at the dental clinic, make any effort to investigate whether Young had a history of “concerns” with other coworkers, or monitor Young’s conduct.

Because she needed more hours to support her family, in August 2010, MacCluskey requested a transfer to MacDougall-Walker Correctional Institution, where she would be assigned to work with Young three days a week. Her transfer request was approved, and she began working at MacDougall-Walker in December 2010. According to MacCluskey, Young’s behavior toward her escalated over a series of months and included the following incidents:

  • He repeatedly commented on her appearance and asked her out.
  • He brought lingerie and bathing suit catalogs to work and asked her to model the clothing in them.
  • He sent her e-mails asking how he could make her “blush”; telling her that there were “rules” for her position, such as kissing him before and when she left work; asking her about “crazy hookups”; and telling her, “I love you.”
  • He repeatedly bumped into her, touched her hair and hands, gave her shoulder rubs, stared at her, and sent her a Valentine’s Day gift.
  • On one occasion in 2011, he stood in a doorway and blocked her from leaving a room, and when she tried to leave, he grabbed her waist, pulled her close, and put his hand up her shirt.

After Young put his hand up her shirt, MacCluskey reported the sexual harassment to Rikel Lightner, her supervisor at MacDougall-Walker, and filed an incident report. Lightner, in turn, reported the complaint to UConn Health. Young was placed on paid administrative leave while UConn Health conducted an investigation. After the investigation revealed that he had violated the internal sexual harassment policy, Young chose to resign rather than be fired.

In September 2013, MacCluskey filed a sexual harassment lawsuit against UConn Health. The case went to trial, and the jury found in MacCluskey’s favor, awarding her $200,000 in damages. UConn Health appealed the jury’s verdict to the 2nd Circuit, arguing there was no legal basis for imputing liability to it because it had no knowledge of Young’s harassment of MacCluskey before she complained in 2011 after the incident in which he put his hand up her shirt.

2nd Circuit’s decision

To prevail on a hostile work environment claim, an employee must prove that (1) the workplace was permeated with discriminatory intimidation that was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of her work environment and (2) there is a specific basis for imputing the conduct that created the hostile environment to the employer. When a hostile work environment claim involves conduct by a coworker rather than a supervisor, the employer is liable only for its own failure to exercise reasonable care to address the harassment. Therefore, the test is whether the employer failed to provide a reasonable avenue for complaint or whether it knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, about the harassment yet failed to take appropriate remedial action.

On appeal, it was undisputed that UConn Health provided a reasonable avenue for complaint, and Mac- Cluskey didn’t report Young’s conduct prior to 2011. The question, then, was whether UConn Health had constructive notice of the harassment. In other words, the crucial issue the appellate court faced was whether UConn Health should have known about the harassment in the exercise of reasonable care.

After considering all the evidence presented at trial, the 2nd Circuit concluded that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that UConn Health should have, in the exercise of reasonable care, known about Young’s harassment. The court specifically highlighted the following facts:

  • After Young sexually harassed another assistant in 2000, he was disciplined and subjected to a last-chance agreement.
  • Young’s supervisors, including Gendell, weren’t made aware of the last-chance agreement.
  • Young’s supervisors should have been monitoring him.
  • From 2009 through 2011, Young made inappropriate comments about MacCluskey’s appearance, inquired about her personal life, and invaded her personal space.
  • At some time between 2009 and 2010, MacCluskey complained about Young’s behavior to two coworkers.
  • Gendell was alerted to a possible issue at the dental clinic involving MacCluskey, but when she asked about the “situation,” she did so in a hallway rather than a private setting and didn’t ask follow-up questions, raise the issue again, or take any further action.
  • Had Gendell been informed about Young’s earlier harassing conduct and his last-chance agreement, she would have conducted a more robust inquiry when she became aware that there was a “situation.”

Given that evidence, the court concluded that UConn Health should have known about Young’s harassment of MacCluskey in 2009 or 2010 and should have taken steps to remediate the situation.

Lessons learned

Given today’s climate in which an ever-increasing number of sexual harassment allegations are being made, employers need to be especially cautious. Certainly, the holding in this case significantly reinforces that need.

Even though UConn Health had an antiharassment policy and MacCluskey didn’t avail herself of its provisions until more than two years after Young began harassing her, the employer was still held liable. The court concluded that given its knowledge of Young’s past harassing behavior, UConn Health didn’t do enough to ensure a harassment-free work environment and protect its employees. For example, it could have monitored Young’s behavior, informed his new supervisors of the last-chance agreement, and, perhaps most important, thoroughly delved into MacCluskey’s report of a “situation.”

Bottom line: It’s clear from this case that today’s environment requires employers to take a proactive approach. You must always be mindful, attentive, and cognizant of the work environment, and if there’s any potential issue that might rise to the level of concerning behavior, you must take immediate steps to address it.

Amy McLaughlin can be reached at or 802-859-7031.