Author: Dinse

Kendall Hoechst, Amy McLaughlin, Editors
Dinse, Knapp & McAndrew, P.C., Burlington

SEX DISCRIMINATION

by Kendall Hoechst

Vermont employers should know that the Vermont Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA) explicitly prohibits discrimination based on not only employees’ sex but also their gender identity and sexual orientation (as well as other protected categories). Thus, on its face, Vermont law is broader than its federal equivalent, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex but doesn’t include the separate characteristics of sexual orientation or gender identity.

Previously, the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals (whose rulings apply to all Vermont employers) held that sexual orientation discrimination claims, including claims that being gay or lesbian constituted nonconformity with a gender stereotype, weren’t covered under Title VII. The 2nd Circuit revisited its previous decisions in a rare en banc sitting—meaning with all the members of the court rather than a three-judge panel—in Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc. The majority held that Title VII prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation as discrimination “because of . . . sex.”

Facts

Donald Zarda, a gay man, was employed as a skydiving instructor at Altitude Express. He frequently participated in tandem dives with Altitude Express clients, which involved being strapped hip to hip and shoulder to shoulder before jumping out of the airplane. Zarda told a female client that he was gay to preempt discomfort with being strapped closely to a man. However, the client claimed that he touched her inappropriately and disclosed his sexual orientation to excuse his behavior. He denied inappropriately touching her. After the jump, the client told her boyfriend her allegation of inappropriate touching. The boyfriend told Zarda’s boss, who fired him.

Zarda sued his employer under both New York law and Title VII, claiming that he was fired because he referred to his sexual orientation and because he didn’t conform to the “straight male macho stereotype.”

The trial court held that Zarda’s Title VII claims were barred under the 2nd Circuit’s previous precedent and ruled in favor of the employer on the federal claim. After a trial on the state-law claim, which required a different standard of proof than the federal claim, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the employer. Zarda appealed to the 2nd Circuit.
Interestingly, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) took opposing views in amicus briefs submitted to the court—i.e., arguments intended to influence the court’s decision written by parties that are not directly involved in the case but have an interest in the outcome. The DOJ argued that Title VII doesn’t prohibit sexual orientation discrimination. The EEOC claimed to be the “primary agency” charged with interpreting Title VII and argued the opposite.
Opinions

The majority opinion had three primary holdings. First, the court held that sexual orientation is a function of sex and, by extension, sexual orientation discrimination is a subset of sex discrimination. The majority concluded that firing a man because he is attracted to men or a woman because she is attracted to women is a decision motived, at least in part, by sex.
Second, the court held that sexual orientation discrimination is rooted in gender stereotypes and thus is a subset of sex discrimination. It recognized that its previous precedents were unworkable because of the difficult lines that were required to be drawn. For example, a woman might have had a Title VII claim if she was fired for being perceived as too “macho” but not if she was fired for being perceived as lesbian.

Third, the court held that sexual orientation discrimination is based on an employer’s opposition to association between particular sexes and thereby discriminates against employees based on their sex. The 2nd Circuit had previously recognized associational discrimination as a violation of Title VII in the context of race discrimination. Thus, like antimiscegenation policies, discrimination based on sexual orientation is a form of associational discrimination prohibited by Title VII.

Four concurring opinions and three dissenting opinions were authored by various judges. Judge Dennis Jacobs concurred in only the associational discrimination justification and found it unnecessary to reach the others, explaining, “A ruling based on Mr. Zarda’s same-sex relationship resolves this appeal; good craft counsels that we go no further. Much of the rest of the Court’s opinion amounts to woke dicta [socially conscious observations that aren’t binding as legal precedent].”

Judge Robert Sack’s opinion also concluded that the appeal could be decided on the “simpler and less fraught” theory of associational discrimination. He noted that the court is in “the context of something of a revolution in American law respecting gender and sex” and therefore thought it best to tread carefully.

Judge José Cabranes concurred only in the judgment in a very brief opinion, essentially opining that his colleagues spilled too much ink getting to the point that sexual orientation is a function of sex, end of story. Judge Cabranes even dropped a footnote quoting a text from the third century B.C. to underscore his point that less is more. Judge Raymond Lohier, Jr., favored a textualist approach and concluded that sex subsumes sexual orientation just as race subsumes ethnicity.

The primary dissent was authored by Judge Gerard Lynch. He explained that he would be “delighted to wake up one morning and learn that Congress had just passed legislation adding sexual orientation to the list of grounds of employment discrimination prohibited under Title VII” and would be “equally pleased to awake to learn that Congress had secretly passed such legislation more than half a century ago.” However, “we all know Congress did no such thing.” He examined the historical context of the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and essentially concluded that classifying people by sexual orientation isn’t the same as classifying them by sex. Discrimination against people whose sexual orientation is homosexual rather than heterosexual, however offensive, isn’t discrimination that treats men and women differently. He also distinguished the majority’s arguments from the U.S. Supreme Court’s constitutional analysis of gay marriage.

Impact

The 2nd Circuit is the third federal appellate court to consider sexual orientation discrimination questions recently. The 7th Circuit, also sitting en banc, ruled in Hively v. Ivy Tech that discrimination based on an employee’s sexual orientation violates Title VII. The 11th Circuit, however, held the opposite in Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital and declined to hear the case en banc. The 8th Circuit is the next court to consider the issue.

Recently, Vermont Attorney General T.J. Donovan joined other attorneys general in filing an amicus brief arguing that Title VII encompasses discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.

There’s now a split among federal circuit courts. The split could be resolved by the Supreme Court or Congress, but the latter seems unlikely in the current political climate. For now, the 2nd Circuit’s decision is the law in Vermont, New York, and Connecticut.

While it was—and remains—illegal to discriminate on the basis of an employee’s sexual orientation in Vermont, the 2nd Circuit’s decision will permit employees to pursue federal discrimination claims based on sexual orientation. That makes it more likely that employees will file future claims in federal court.

Furthermore, Vermont courts still look to federal law when interpreting state law, so future federal decisions regarding discrimination based on sexual orientation will have implications for state law.

Kendall Hoechst can be reached at khoechst@dinse.com or 802-859-7042.

Amy M. McLaughlin, Kendall Hoechst, Editors
Dinse, Knapp & McAndrew, P.C., Burlington

by Jeff Nolan

Soon, it will be legal in Vermont for people who are 21 or older to possess limited quantities of marijuana and marijuana plants. You may be wondering whether the new law affects your ability to enforce rules on smoking or the use of drugs in your workplace. In short, the answer is, nope. In crafting the law, the Vermont Legislature specifically addressed workplace issues and made clear that the law doesn’t require employers to change their policies or permit the use or possession of marijuana at work.

General provisions of the law

The new law, titled “An act relating to eliminating penalties for possession of limited amounts of marijuana by adults 21 years of age and older,” was signed by Governor Phil Scott on January 22, 2018. The portions of the law relevant to our discussion will go into effect on July 1. The law defines “marijuana” as “all parts of the plant,” including seeds, resin, and compounds derived from the plant, its seeds, or its resin, but not mature stalks, hemp, or other excluded parts.

As of July 1, 2018, individuals who are 21 years old or older will be permitted to possess up to one ounce of marijuana or five grams of hashish, and cultivate up to two mature marijuana plants or four immature marijuana plants. Criminal penalties apply if a person possesses more than is allowed by those limits. The criminal penalties increase with second and third offenses, and with larger amounts of marijuana.

The law prohibits the consumption of marijuana in a “public place,” which is defined as “any street, alley, park, sidewalk, public building other than individual dwellings, any place of public accommodation [as defined in the Vermont Public Accommodations Act, or VPAA], and any place where the use or possession of a lighted tobacco product, tobacco product, or tobacco substitute . . . is prohibited by law.”

The law doesn’t protect people who possess or consume marijuana from laws related to driving under the influence of marijuana or consuming marijuana while driving, it doesn’t limit the authority of primary or secondary schools to impose administrative penalties for the possession of marijuana on school property, and it doesn’t prohibit landlords from, among other things, banning the possession or use of marijuana in lease agreements.

Provisions of particular interest to employers

Some provisions of the law actively prohibit marijuana use in workplaces, while others explicitly allow employers to continue to regulate whether marijuana can be possessed or used on their premises.

In terms of active prohibitions, as noted above, the law prohibits the “consumption” of marijuana in a “public place,” which includes “any place of public accommodation as defined in” the VPAA. The definition of “public accommodation” in the VPAA is broad and includes “any school, restaurant, store, establishment, or other facility at which services, facilities, goods, privileges, advantages, benefits, or accommodations are offered to the general public.” That means people will still be prohibited from consuming marijuana in a workplace that falls within that definition, regardless of the employer’s policies.

Similarly, the law actively prohibits the consumption of marijuana in “any place where the use or possession of a lighted tobacco product, tobacco product, or tobacco substitute” is prohibited by law. As Vermont employers know, Vermont law generally prohibits, with some exceptions, smoking in “an enclosed structure where employees perform services for an employer.” That means people are not permitted to consume marijuana in the vast majority of workplace settings that are not specifically exempted from the law prohibiting smoking in the workplace.

The new pot law also reserves for employers the ability to continue to regulate the possession or use of marijuana on the job. Specifically, the law provides that none of its provisions should be construed to:

• Require an employer to permit or accommodate the use, consumption, possession, transfer, display, transportation, sale, or growing of marijuana in the workplace;

• Prevent an employer from adopting a policy that prohibits the use of marijuana in the workplace;

• Create a claim against an employer that terminates an employee for violating a policy that restricts or prohibits employees’ use of marijuana; or

• Prevent an employer from prohibiting or otherwise regulating the use, consumption, possession, transfer, display, transportation, sale, or growing of marijuana on the employer’s premises.

Those provisions mean you are essentially free to maintain or create policies that prohibit the possession, consumption, sale, or cultivation of marijuana and terminate employees who violate your policies, and the law doesn’t create a method by which employees can sue you for doing that (known as a “private right of action”).

It should be noted that the marijuana law doesn’t mention Vermont’s drug-testing law. As Vermont employers know, the drug-testing law places strict limitations on when and how employees can be subjected to drug testing. Those restrictions must continue to be observed carefully, and you shouldn’t view the legalization of marijuana as permission to conduct more stringent drug testing that isn’t allowed by the drug-testing law. On the other hand, if you permissibly test an employee and the result is positive for marijuana use in violation of your policies, the marijuana law wouldn’t prevent you from taking action under your policies to the extent permitted by the drug-testing law.

Medical marijuana

The medical marijuana/disability issue is also worth noting. Employment disputes involving medical marijuana usually revolve around questions of whether the use of marijuana is “lawful.” The use of medical or recreational marijuana remains unlawful under federal law, regardless of Vermont’s new marijuana law. So if an employee appears to be under the influence of marijuana at work, you can take action even if the employee is authorized to use medical marijuana.

However, if an employee tests positive for marijuana use through a drug test, there’s no question about whether he’s impaired at work, and he explains that he uses marijuana for medical reasons, it would be worthwhile to consult legal counsel about the best way to arrive at a practical solution that could resolve the issue while respecting any safety-related requirements of the employee’s job and your worksite. (For more on Vermont’s medical marijuana law, see “Employers’ medical marijuana rights, obligations under Vermont law” on pg. 1 of our February 2016 issue.)

Policy implications

Many employers have enacted policies that prohibit the possession, consumption, or distribution of “illegal drugs” but do not mention marijuana specifically or list all of the drugs that are prohibited. As we noted above, marijuana remains an illegal drug under federal law. The new Vermont marijuana law eliminates only state-law penalties for the possession and use of marijuana within certain parameters. Therefore, a policy that references “illegal drugs” would still technically be effective. However, if you want to clarify the point and avoid after-the-fact policy interpretation arguments with your employees, you may wish to specifically identify marijuana as a prohibited substance in your policies.

Bottom line

It’s good to see that lawmakers were thinking of Vermont employers when they crafted the new marijuana law and eliminated some potential questions before they could even be asked. In sum, if your organization prohibits the possession, use, and distribution of marijuana on the job, it will be business as usual. That shouldn’t be surprising since employers can obviously prohibit the use of legal substances such as alcohol in the workplace, and the liberalization of marijuana laws shouldn’t affect employer discretion on safety-related issues.

If you don’t have explicit policies addressing marijuana use but anticipate that you may be asked about your stance in light of the new law, you should consider creating some policy language clarifying your organization’s position on marijuana use, particularly in workplace areas covered by the law prohibiting smoking in the workplace and in places of public accommodation. Then, if an employee asks to use pot at work and tells you that you can’t prohibit it under the new law, you can say with confidence: “Dude, you must be high! Read the policy!”

Jeff Nolan can be reached at jnolan@dinse.com or 802-864-5751.

Amy M. McLaughlin, Kendall Hoechst, Editors
Dinse, Knapp & McAndrew, P.C., Burlington

by Amy McLaughlin

The “#MeToo” movement is sweeping across the country and calling well-deserved attention to the issue of sexual harassment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit (whose rulings apply to all Vermont employers) is following suit. In a recent decision, the 2nd Circuit chided an employer for not doing enough to monitor the work environment and ensure it was harassment-free. Employers, pay attention: This case illustrates the new standard of heightened awareness.

Facts

In late 1999 or early 2000, a female dental assistant complained to the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities that Dr. Michael Young, the dentist with whom she worked at University of Connecticut Health Center (UConn Health), had harassed her. The dental assistant alleged that Young sent her gifts and notes saying things like “You’re beautiful” or “I love your smile.”

The complaint resulted in a “last-chance” agreement between Young and UConn Health that required Young to see a psychiatrist and imposed a 10-day suspension on him for “offensive conduct towards a [coworker], poor judgment, and not cooperating during the initial investigation.” The agreement further provided that he could be fired for “any future instances of unsolicited flirtatious letters or comments to any employee, or any behavior similar to this.”

When he returned to work following his suspension, Young received no additional attention, monitoring, or training. Further, UConn Health never informed his subsequent supervisors that he had been the subject of a sexual harassment complaint or that he was disciplined as a result of the complaint, including being put on a last-chance agreement.

Fast-forward to March 2008, when UConn Health hired Mindy MacCluskey as a dental assistant. MacCluskey began working with Young two days a week at Manson Youth Institute, a Connecticut Department of Corrections facility. Approximately six months after she began working at Manson, Young started making comments about MacCluskey’s appearance and what she was wearing, called her “young and beautiful,” and commented that he was surprised she had three children. He also asked her personal questions that made her uncomfortable, such as inquiring about her relationship with her children’s father and asking whether “anybody has ever cheated.” Moreover, he stood very close to her in a way she described as “creepy.”

MacCluskey reported Young’s conduct to both a coworker and a nurse who was also a union representative. Someone then reported to Dr. Alexis Gendell, who supervised both Young and MacCluskey at Manson, that there was a concern at the dental clinic. Gendell stopped MacCluskey in the hallway and asked “if there was a situation, is everything [OK],” to which MacCluskey replied, “There is a situation and I’m all set. It is under control.”

UConn Health never made Gendell aware of the earlier sexual harassment complaint against Young or his last-chance agreement. Gendell didn’t follow up on the conversation with MacCluskey to inquire about the nature of the concern at the dental clinic, make any effort to investigate whether Young had a history of “concerns” with other coworkers, or monitor Young’s conduct.

Because she needed more hours to support her family, in August 2010, MacCluskey requested a transfer to MacDougall-Walker Correctional Institution, where she would be assigned to work with Young three days a week. Her transfer request was approved, and she began working at MacDougall-Walker in December 2010. According to MacCluskey, Young’s behavior toward her escalated over a series of months and included the following incidents:

• He repeatedly commented on her appearance and asked her out.
• He brought lingerie and bathing suit catalogs to work and asked her to model the clothing in them.
• He sent her e-mails asking how he could make her “blush”; telling her that there were “rules” for her position, such as kissing him before and when she left work; asking her about “crazy hookups”; and telling her, “I love you.”
• He repeatedly bumped into her, touched her hair and hands, gave her shoulder rubs, stared at her, and sent her a Valentine’s Day gift.
• On one occasion in 2011, he stood in a doorway and blocked her from leaving a room, and when she tried to leave, he grabbed her waist, pulled her close, and put his hand up her shirt.

After Young put his hand up her shirt, MacCluskey reported the sexual harassment to Rikel Lightner, her supervisor at MacDougall-Walker, and filed an incident report. Lightner, in turn, reported the complaint to UConn Health. Young was placed on paid administrative leave while UConn Health conducted an investigation. After the investigation revealed that he had violated the internal sexual harassment policy, Young chose to resign rather than be fired.

In September 2013, MacCluskey filed a sexual harassment lawsuit against UConn Health. The case went to trial, and the jury found in MacCluskey’s favor, awarding her $200,000 in damages. UConn Health appealed the jury’s verdict to the 2nd Circuit, arguing there was no legal basis for imputing liability to it because it had no knowledge of Young’s harassment of MacCluskey before she complained in 2011 after the incident in which he put his hand up her shirt.

2nd Circuit’s decision

To prevail on a hostile work environment claim, an employee must prove that (1) the workplace was permeated with discriminatory intimidation that was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of her work environment and (2) there is a specific basis for imputing the conduct that created the hostile environment to the employer. When a hostile work environment claim involves conduct by a coworker rather than a supervisor, the employer is liable only for its own failure to exercise reasonable care to address the harassment. Therefore, the test is whether the employer failed to provide a reasonable avenue for complaint or whether it knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, about the harassment yet failed to take appropriate remedial action.

On appeal, it was undisputed that UConn Health provided a reasonable avenue for complaint, and Mac- Cluskey didn’t report Young’s conduct prior to 2011. The question, then, was whether UConn Health had constructive notice of the harassment. In other words, the crucial issue the appellate court faced was whether UConn Health should have known about the harassment in the exercise of reasonable care.

After considering all the evidence presented at trial, the 2nd Circuit concluded that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that UConn Health should have, in the exercise of reasonable care, known about Young’s harassment. The court specifically highlighted the following facts:

• After Young sexually harassed another assistant in 2000, he was disciplined and subjected to a last-chance agreement.
• Young’s supervisors, including Gendell, weren’t made aware of the last-chance agreement.
• Young’s supervisors should have been monitoring him.
• From 2009 through 2011, Young made inappropriate comments about MacCluskey’s appearance, inquired about her personal life, and invaded her personal space.
• At some time between 2009 and 2010, MacCluskey complained about Young’s behavior to two coworkers.
• Gendell was alerted to a possible issue at the dental clinic involving MacCluskey, but when she asked about the “situation,” she did so in a hallway rather than a private setting and didn’t ask follow-up questions, raise the issue again, or take any further action.
• Had Gendell been informed about Young’s earlier harassing conduct and his last-chance agreement, she would have conducted a more robust inquiry when she became aware that there was a “situation.”

Given that evidence, the court concluded that UConn Health should have known about Young’s harassment of MacCluskey in 2009 or 2010 and should have taken steps to remediate the situation.

Lessons learned

Given today’s climate in which an ever-increasing number of sexual harassment allegations are being made, employers need to be especially cautious. Certainly, the holding in this case significantly reinforces that need.

Even though UConn Health had an antiharassment policy and MacCluskey didn’t avail herself of its provisions until more than two years after Young began harassing her, the employer was still held liable. The court concluded that given its knowledge of Young’s past harassing behavior, UConn Health didn’t do enough to ensure a harassment-free work environment and protect its employees. For example, it could have monitored Young’s behavior, informed his new supervisors of the last-chance agreement, and, perhaps most important, thoroughly delved into MacCluskey’s report of a “situation.”

Bottom line: It’s clear from this case that today’s environment requires employers to take a proactive approach. You must always be mindful, attentive, and cognizant of the work environment, and if there’s any potential issue that might rise to the level of concerning behavior, you must take immediate steps to address it.

Amy McLaughlin can be reached at amclaughlin@dinse.com or 802-859-7031.

Karen McAndrew, Leigh Cole, Editors
Dinse, Knapp & McAndrew, P.C., Burlington

by Karen McAndrew

The Vermont Supreme Court recently shed some light—although not total clarity—on the effect an employee-signed release agreement can have on any later worker’s comp claims she may file.

Facts

Brandy Clayton was a hair stylist at a J.C. Penney store. In February 2011, she filed a worker’s comp claim for a painful left foot condition that she alleged first occurred in March 2010 as a result of standing on her feet all day. Her employer accepted the claim as compensable.

In October 2013, while Clayton’s claim was being processed and settlement discussions were underway, she saw a podiatrist for pain in her right foot as well as her left foot. The podiatrist noted that her pain in both feet was likely related to standing all day at work. She saw the podiatrist again for the same complaints in early 2014, and in June 2014, she told an independent medical examiner of pain in both feet.

In September 2014, Clayton and J.C. Penney signed a “Full and Final Form 16 Settlement Agreement” related to the March 2010 injury and filed it with the Vermont Department of Labor (VDOL) for approval. A completed Form 16 must be filed before the VDOL will approve any settlement of a worker’s comp claim.

The accompanying release agreement contained something of a mash-up of language pertaining specifically to Clayton’s March 2010 work-related injury and any associated conditions and broad general release language about any injury or condition related in any way to her employment.

By statute, the labor commissioner can approve a worker’s comp settlement only if its terms are in the employee’s best interests. To this end, a hearing officer appointed by the commissioner sent Clayton a letter that referred to her “foot pain” resulting from her work activities and cautioned that she should understand that signing the release “means that if you get worse in the future and need to see a doctor . . . or even have to search for a less strenuous job, you will not be entitled to any worker’s compensation assistance. I need to know that you completely understand this.”

Clayton signed the agreement, with the acknowledgment that she understood “that once the agreement is approved, I will relinquish my right to all future worker’s compensation benefits causally related to my . . . work injury.” The hearing officer then approved the settlement.

Six months later, in March 2015, Clayton filed a worker’s comp claim for injury to her right foot. J.C. Penney filed a form denial, stating that the condition predated the release and was causally related to her left foot injury. The commissioner held that the release barred all claims causally related to the specific work-related injury but then took it upon herself to rule that a release that bars anything other than claims related to the specific work-related injury—here, the left foot injury—is void as a matter of public policy. The parties appealed the commissioner’s ruling to the Vermont Supreme Court.

Court weighs in

The specific question before the supreme court, therefore, was whether the commissioner had the authority to void a release on public policy grounds, and the court held that she did not.

The powers of an administrative agency such as the VDOL are limited to those specifically granted by statute. The applicable statute in this case says the commissioner has the power to disapprove of a settlement or release only if it doesn’t conform to the general worker’s comp scheme or if it is found not to be in the best interests of the employee. In this case, there was the added fact that the commissioner’s designee—the hearing officer—had previously approved the release, so the commissioner had no authority to reverse that decision.

This is where the confusion comes in, however, because in the end it’s not clear what the dispute was about. The commissioner had held that the release was valid insofar as it covered conditions arising from the original work-related injury but not to unrelated claims arising from later injuries. The supreme court said it was valid to the extent it covered injuries that “pre-date or co-occurred” with that March 2010 injury, and J.C. Penney had apparently narrowed its defense on appeal to a contention that Clayton’s right foot injury was causally related to her left foot injury. So it seems like everyone was on the same page, in which case it’s not clear why the supreme court even waded into what appears to be a nonissue.

Moreover, the court’s opinion doesn’t clarify what would seem to be the critical issue: Does the release cover all work-related injuries—such as the right foot injury—that occurred before the date the release was signed?

In most other contexts, releases are written in terms of any claims “known or unknown” that have occurred up to the date of the signing of the release—and the release in this case, while somewhat poorly worded, contains language to that effect. The court referred only to injuries that “pre-date or co-occurred” with the left foot injury. It didn’t address the question of whether the release would bar further related claims. If the right foot injury happened after the left foot injury but before the release was signed and it was known at the time the release was signed, would the release bar a claim on the right foot? That answer will have to wait for another day.

However, the court did provide some helpful language about the enforceability of releases in the worker’s comp context. Once a release is approved by the labor commissioner, it may be set aside only if entered into under circumstances of fraud or “mutual mistake of fact,” which are the general standards for setting aside any otherwise valid contract.

Bottom line

The main message, in this and other contexts, is the importance of clarity and precision in contractual language, including releases, which are often used in connection with settlement of discrimination, wrongful termination, and other employment-related claims as well as worker’s comp claims.

Karen McAndrew can be reached at kmcandrew@dinse.com or 802-864-5751.